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ACCESS TO INFORMATION 
IN THE UK AND INDIA.1 
by Ben WORTHY, Lecturer at the Birkbeck College, University 
of London. 
 
his paper examines the impact of two pieces of transparency 
legislation: the UK Freedom of Information Act 2005 and 
the Indian Right to Information Act 2005. It looks at the 
origins and composition of the laws before examining how the two 
pieces of legislation function. Both laws have led to transparency 
and accountability by exposure and the raising of “fire alarms”, 
with information disclosure being used to bring about 
accountability as well as, to a more limited extent, reform and 
behavioural change. Of the two laws, the Indian RTI has proved 
more “politicised” and more capable of initiating political 
participation. Yet the “transformative” powers of such reforms are 
limited by poor implementation and resistance. Moreover, the 
effectiveness of such laws is shaped by context, with India in 
particular facing deep and complex socio-political obstacles that 
may prevent the laws from having the “revolutionary” effects 
advocates had hoped.  
TRANSPARENCY 
Transparency broadly means making “decisions, rules and other 
information visible from outside” (Hood 2010, 989). In the 
modern world it is now widely accepted as a key component of 
modern government (Hood 2010).  
The belief in the beneficial effects of transparency and public 
exposure has a pedigree that dates back to the Enlightenment 
(Darch and Underwood 2010). Bentham’s “Panopticon”, as one of 
the foremost examples, saw openness as a low-cost means of 
enforcing discipline and behavioural change within particular 
institutions (Bentham 2010). In the last century, there has emerged 
a more modern belief that enabling greater access reduces 
“information asymmetry” between public and government 
creating greater transparency and accountability. This in turn may 
increase democratic legitimacy, public trust and institutional 
effectiveness (Stiglitz 2003).  
This faith in the universally beneficial effects of transparency lies 
at the heart of a range of modern “transparency instruments”. The 
mechanisms include general Access to Information or Freedom of 
Information laws as well as a growing number of focused 
regulations, covering specific activities such as lobbying access, 
records of meetings and personal records. These are now being 
                                                
1 This paper is based on findings and a draft chapter in The Elgar Research Handbook 
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supplemented by a variety of online transparency experiments 
using Open Data (Worthy 2013a).  
Access to Information laws (also known as Freedom of 
Information or Right to Information laws) now exist in 92 
countries (Access Info/CLD 2013). They have been pushed as a 
key driver for improving government transparency and 
accountability, promoting more open cultures within public bodies 
and, it is hoped, increasing public participation and trust (Worthy 
2010). In the developing world they are seen as a powerful anti-
corruption weapon and a means of securing wider social and 
political rights (Darch and Underwood 2010).  
While the idea of transparency appears simple, it conceals nuances 
and complex interpretations. According to Meijer “the specific 
form that government transparency takes – or does not –varies 
enormously. There is no uniform, standardized approach to 
transparency but an immense variety of sorts and types of 
government transparency” laws (2013, 2). The impact of FOI is 
“highly idiographic” and the “social and political contexts and 
specific histories of different countries” need to be taken into 
account (Darch and Underwood 2010, 7).  
Recent work has examined how transparency can move in different 
directions with different intentions, ranging from, for example, 
“mapping at high levels of aggregation” to localised, if not street 
level, “micro-level” openness (Heald 2012, 41). The dynamics are 
“complex because they entail interactions between a variety of 
actors, uncertain values and rapidly changing technology” and take 
place within “a variety of legal frameworks, in different cultural 
settings, and within complex national…policy contexts” 
(Meijer 2013, 1). These variations can lead to strategic uncertainty 
regarding aims, cognitive uncertainty as to policy options, and 
institutional uncertainty as transparency shifts rules and procedures 
(Meijer 2013, 3-4). Recent experimental research found that 
transparency in different policy areas can have very different 
effects on both institutions and public perceptions (De Fine Licht 
2013: Grimmelikhaujsen 2012).  
§ 1 – ACCESS TO INFORMATION IN THE UK AND INDIA 
As an object of study, access to information laws present special 
problems. First, such laws are powerfully symbolic policies 
representing a redistribution of power from elites to the populace 
by handing control over a key democratic resource, information 
(See Dahl 1989). However, like other symbolic policies, the 
problems is in the details. Many such laws suffer from serious 
implementation problems while other exist simply as “paper laws” 
(Edelman 1964). An effective analysis lf laws require detailed 
scrutiny of their context and operation (Meijer 2013). A second 
problem concerns the dynamic of how laws operate. ATI laws 
evolve over time, producing conflict and are subject to change. The 
political and legal dynamics are often characterised as battles over 
openness between the resister (government) and openness 
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advocates (Roberts 2006). While such a dynamic frequently exists, 
added complication stems from the political situation (new 
governments, scandals, rulings from courts or appeal bodies) as 
well as the socio-cultural influences (prevalence of corruption, 
levels of involvement in politics and attitudes towards politicians).  
Both the Indian and UK Access to Information laws have been 
subject to academic and political scrutiny. In the UK research has 
examined the impact of the UK Freedom of Information Act at 
the central government level (Hazell, Glover and Worthy 2010: 
Worthy 2010), at the local level (Chapman and Hunt 2010: Worthy 
et al 2011 and Worthy 2013), and some research has focused on 
specific institutions such as Parliament (Hazell et al 2012). Studies 
have also looked at specific groups such as journalists 
(Hayes 2009), NGOs (Spence 2009) and MPs (Worthy 2012). The 
Act has also been subject to scrutiny by the Ministry of Justice 
(2011) and post-legislative scrutiny by a House of Commons Select 
Committee (2012).  
The passage of India’s Right to Information law led to a surge of 
interest, with India now being regarded as a “laboratory” for 
understanding the impact of transparency laws (Roberts 2010, 27). 
Numerous works have outlined the development of RTI in India 
(Jenkins and Goetz 1999: Jenkins 2007: Singh 2007: Singh and 
Karn 2012). Roberts has examined India’s “implementation more 
doggedly than any other country” with 10 studies in two years 
(2010, 3-4). This includes the largest RTI study in the world to date 
by Raag/NCPRI (2009) involving 35,000 interviews and 800 RTI 
requests, as well as government inspections (3). Recently, 
RAAG/CES published a very comprehensive new report 
examining the impact of RTI in India 2011-2013 following on from 
their previous one. These studies are extremely important not only 
for their findings, but for their methodology and research 
approach, which involved a series of interviews, focus groups and 
requests. 
There has also been analysis of the link between economic growth, 
corruption and RTI, both quantitatively (Bhattacharyya and 
Jha 2011) and through ground level RCT style experiments 
involving use of real RTI requests to measure the effects of use on 
corruption (Peisakhin and Pinto 2010: Peisakhin 2012). There is 
also a body of “thick” anthropological studies of RTI use by NGOs 
and activists (Webb 2012: Webb 2010) and examination of the lack 
of use by the media (Relly and Schwalbe 2013). However, there is 
also a re-thinking around how and why the law was passed, moving 
away from the “myth” of RTI as a grassroots movement upwards 
or a “transformative” law (Sharma 2013: Sharma 2012).  
UK AND INDIA 
A comparison between India and the UK offers a superficially similar 
case along certain dimensions. Both India and the UK passed Access 
to Information laws at the turn of the Twenty-First century, following 
a long political struggle (Worthy 2010: Sharma 2013). Indeed, both 
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came into force in the same year. The passage of legislation in both 
countries appeared to have a powerful symbolic import: in the case of 
the UK, after being historically the one of the world’s most “secretive” 
democracies, and in India as a firm advance towards further 
democratisation. Britain’s colonial legacy also means that the two 
countries share broadly the same governing apparatus with similar 
political and legal-bureaucratic structures. 
However, here the comparisons end (Roberts 2010, 2). The UK is one 
of the most notoriously “secretive” democracies in the developed 
world, a latecomer to FOI but one with a strong administrative 
tradition. India by contrast presents a far more difficult challenge. 
Roberts succinctly states the complex political, economic and social 
picture: 
Its per-capita GDP is roughly one-twentieth of the United States. 
Two-thirds of its 1.2 billion people still lives in rural areas… Forty 
percent of the population is illiterate, and many belong to oppressed 
social groups and] there is recurrent sectional and political violence 
(2010, 2) 
Moreover, India is blighted with deep problems of political corruption 
(Bhattacharyya and Jha 2011). To illustrate the challenges, Webb 
points out that more than 45% of Delhi’s population live in “slums, 
squat settlements or unauthorised colonies” (2012, 207). Despite the 
“universal” claims of benefits that transparency advocates claim flow 
from access to information, the differing contexs and environments 
are crucial to understanding how the two transparency laws perform 
and the possible impact, influence and effect of such laws.  
§ 2 – ACCESS TO INFORMATION AS A REGULATORY MECHANISM 
Access to Information can be seen as fitting within a broad range 
of “non-traditional regulation and audit” mechanisms (8). As a 
regulatory mechanism, Cave et al argue that “smart regulations” 
consist of “all mechanisms affecting behaviour” that may be 
“enabling or facilitative” as well as preventative: a green light as 
well as red light (Baldwin, Cave and Lodge 2011, 3).  
Access to Information constitutes a “smart” regulatory device that 
exists alongside other innovations such as “crowd-sourcing” and 
using the “public eye” to detect problems (Fung et al 2013). The 
possible effects of access are three-fold. First, legislation may act 
as a pre-emptive safeguard, a deterrent, whose very presence 
creates positive “anticipated reactions” as public bodies improve 
decision-making or processes or desist in poor behaviour. Second, 
it can also be a reactive serving as a “fire alarm”, highlighting 
problems which can then be addressed and, in certain 
circumstances, drive institutional change (McGubbins and 
Schwartz 1984). Third, as a facilitator, it may drive more positive 
“open cultures”, relations and more professionalised processes. 
One way of looking at access laws is to view them as a variant of 
“citizen” or ‘crowd-sourced “regulation”, part of a shift towards 
what Keane (2009) calls “Monitory democracy”, whereby an 
eclectic mix of “extra-parliamentary…power-monitoring and 
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power-controlling devices” from courts to social media, gradually 
replacing the traditional means of representation, act as 
“watchdog” and “barking dog” on government (xxvii). 
A) ORIGINS 
Access to Information laws are frequently formed through long 
political struggles and campaigns. Passage of access laws often 
requires a combination of “lone crusaders” and “reluctant 
stewards” pushing against increasing bureaucratic and political 
resistance (Snell 2000). Michener (2011) points out that the 
problem with such reform is “political. The symbolic qualities of 
FOI laws attract support but the ideal effect-to expose the doings 
of politicians and officials to ongoing public scrutiny-weakens the 
political will to enact strong laws” (146).  
FOI in the UK was introduced as part of a programme intended 
to deepen democracy and modernise the political system in the late 
1990s (Worthy 2007). Tony Blair referred to it as as a 
“revolutionary” approach and a “quite extraordinary offer” to open 
up government (Blair 2010, 127). It was presented as one of a series 
of changes designed to reform and “democratise” Britain alongside 
a sweeping series of constitutional reforms involving devolution of 
power and the creation of new rights for citizens (Bogdanor 2010). 
Access laws would, it was argued, help make government more 
transparent and accountable and hopefully increase public 
participation and trust (Worthy 2010).  
By contrast RTI was passed in India, according to legend, as part 
of a strong “second wave” anti-corruption drive powered by 
grassroots activists, famously the MKSS group in Rajasthan 
(Jenkins and Goetz 1999: Webb 2012). The truth is more complex, 
with the arrival of RTI enabled by disintegrating and migrating 
elites, moving from government to business, and working with 
supportive officials within government (Sharma 2013). 
Nevertheless, the political and transformative power of 
information rights in India was far stronger: RTI was described 
variously as “revolutionary”, a “watershed moment” and the 
beginnings of a “socio-economic revolution” (see Roberts 2010, 
3). The law would not only bring transparency but “purge 
inefficiency and corruption” and “increase the influence of 
marginalised citizens” (Roberts 2010, 2). In India this “socio-
economic narrative” around RTI has proved “compelling” 
(Calland and Bentley 2013, s80). Here the difference between 
“Freedom of Information” and “Right to Information” takes on 
added significance, as the latter is given a “politicised” and “active” 
edge that the former lacks (Darch and Underwood 2010). 
B) OPERATION 
Most Access to Information laws share the same broad features. They 
legally mandate access to information within a fixed time period and 
subject to certain exceptions (often called “exemptions”) for national 
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security, policy-making, confidence and other areas. Dissatisfied 
requesters can appeal via an independent body. Laws also mandate 
“pro-active” disclosure of information (Access Info/CLD 2013).  
The Indian and UK FOI laws came into force in 2005 and share many 
such features: a broad access to information held by a range of bodies, 
with a strict time-period for reply and enforcement by an independent 
appeal mechanism (see Table 1). The two laws have extensive scope, 
stretching from central and local government to educational 
institutions and health services. Both Acts contain an uncertain grey 
area around where the remit of the Act ends (see below). 
Both also link into wider laws. The UK FOI law is part of range of 
laws and regulations mandating openness and access. Legislation 
allowing access to documents and public meetings has existed at local 
government level since the 1960s (Worthy 2013). Successive data 
protection laws and area specific laws (in housing, medical records) 
also give citizens rights to particular information, while EU legislation 
grants public access to environmental information under the Aarhus 
convention. In the past few years, FOI has increasingly merged and 
overlapped with a number of initiatives and codes of practice around 
“Open Data” and online publication of information and datasets. In 
2012, the FOI Act was amended to allow access to large datasets 
(Worthy 2013a).  
Similarly, the Indian Act is rooted in a series of court rulings form the 
1970s onwards. In the 1990s a number of state level Acts were passed, 
famously begun in Rajasthan (Goetz and Jenkins 1999: Roberts 2010). 
The Act now sits alongside several pieces of legislation mandating 
forms of information disclosure. For example, the National Rural 
Employment Guarantee Act 2005, designed to provide a minimum 
standard of employment for the rural poor, mandates disclosure of 
payroll records as well as project documents (Roberts 2010, 24-25). 
Successive Indian governments have committed to making 
themselves “SMART” (Simple, Moral, Accountable, Responsible and 
Transparent) through a succession e-government reforms designed to 
fit alongside RTI (Wright el at 2010, 3:16: Roberts 2010). 
Though the laws are broadly the same, several differences bear 
scrutiny. First the UK Act contains a Cabinet level veto, which can be 
used by Ministers to block appeal decisions. The veto has now been 
used five times since 2005 to prevent the release of information 
covering Cabinet discussions over the war in Iraq and correspondence 
between Prince Charles and the government (House of Commons 
Library 2012). While the use of this veto has been relatively restrained 
by international standards, each veto is seen as signalling lack of faith 
in the system. Moreover, the government has now raised the 
possibility of broadening the circumstances in which it can be used 
(House of Commons Library 2012,5: MOJ 2012, 17-20). Second, the 
Indian act contains a standard application fee (of 10 rupees) while the 
UK Act provides free access in almost all cases. It is not clear what 
effect application fees may have. However, in the case of India the 
actual cost of making a request may be much higher (see below) Third, 
the time period for a response is longer under the RTI Act than under 
FOI, an additional 10 days, though the Indian legislation. Like other 
 Access to Information in the UK and India – Ben Worthy 
– 209 – 
International Journal of Open Government 
http://ojs.imodev.org/index.php?journal=RIGO 
countries that have experienced disorder, the RTI contains a special 
provision for “emergency” release of information that threatens “life 
or liberty”. Fourth, while the UK contains a duty to “advise” and 
“assist” with requests, the Indian RTI Act contains a far stronger 
compulsion. The Information Commission can impose a fine of 250 
rupees per day for an unanswered request. It is not clear how often 
this provision has been enforced or used. One study found almost no 
enforcement and another claimed that “it is common knowledge they 
are rarely applied” (Raag/NCPRI 2009: Peisakhin 2012, 11). 
Table 1: Comparison of the key features of the UK and Indian 
access to information legislation  
Features UK “Freedom of 
Information 
Act 2000’ 
Indian ‘Right to 
Information 
Act 2005’ 
Coverage Public authorities 
including central and 
local government, 
National Health 
Service, educational 
institutions 
Public authorities 
including central and 
local government, 
educational 
institutions. Private 
providers? 
Appeal process Independent 
Commissioner (ICO) 
then Appeal Tribunal 
and Courts  
Independent central 
Commission or state 
and courts 
Time limit on 
response 
20 days 30 days (except in 
threat to life or 
liberty 48 hours) 
Cost of making a 
request 
Free Discretionary fee 
Number of 
Exemptions 
23 (though half 
subject to a Public 
Interest Test) 
8 
(RTI Rating 2013: RTI Rating 2013a) 
One of the interesting effects of both laws is their post-
implementation dynamic. As systems based on use, they transform 
and shift over time, innovating and moving in unexpected 
directions. The RTI Act has led to the development of a national 
telephone helpline, video appeal hearings for remote locations and 
experiments with FOI requests via text or online (Calland and 
Bentley 2013: Roberts 2010). In the UK, the Act has led to the 
development of an online portal WhatDoTheyKnow.com, that enables 
requests and responses to be published online open to all, which 
accounts for around 10% of all FOI requests (Hazell et al 2010, 
241). 
§ 3 – OPERATION AND HOW ACCESS TO INFORMATION IS USED 
After nearly a decade of operation there are now emerging patterns 
on use. In India and the UK, use can be described as high, locally 
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focused and diverse (see table 2). Interestingly, at all levels RTI use 
in India appears more “politically” focused than in the UK. 
Table 2: Use of access to information legislation in India and 
the UK  
 India  UK2 
Estimated 
number of 
requests filed 
2011-2012 
2.3, 000,000 150,000 
Estimated user 
groups  
Public and 
NGOs/Sangathans (and 
business?) 
Public, NGOs, 
media and business 
“Typical” 
requester 
Male, middle class, 
urban 
Male, middle class, 
middle aged 
High profile 
releases 
Commonwealth Games 
scandal 2010 
MPs’ Expenses 
scandal 2009 
Focus of requests Local and regional 
government 
Local government 
(70-80%) 
(CHRI 2013a: Raag/NCPRI 2009: Hazell et al 2010: Worthy et al 2011) 
There is little research on the patterns of requests. White (2007) 
speaks of the ‘iceberg’ effect, whereby a small number of requests 
attract attention and controversy while the vast number of 
quotidian requests remains unseen and unnoticed. This view was 
confirmed in later studies in the UK (Hazell et al 2010: Worthy et 
al 2011). A decade of requests in both countries provides some 
insight regarding who is using these laws and how they are using 
them.  
First, in both India and the UK use is relatively high. Even though 
less than 1 in 1000 people have used the UK, and far fewer in India, 
the two laws appear to be heavily used compared with usage rates 
in other countries (Hazell and Worthy 2010).  
Second, the pattern in both India and the UK suggests that, 
underneath the high profile use, most requests are locally focused. 
The majority of requests in the UK and India are submitted to local 
or regional government (Worthy 2013: Roberts 2010: Calland and 
Bentley 2013).  
Third, the user groups are interestingly different. In the UK, both 
locally and centrally, users are a diverse mix of the public, a few 
journalists, NGOs and businesses, with the latter particularly heavy 
users at the local government level (Hazell et al 2010: Worthy 
2013). By contrast in India it appears to be a mixture of the public, 
NGOs and Sangathans, local unaffiliated and unsupported 
campaign groups (Webb 2012: Raag/NCPRI 2009).  
Interestingly, in both countries, use appears to be driven by the 
middle class, with ‘public’ use driven by the better-off or elite. 
While this usage reflects ‘normal’ patterns of political activism, it 
                                                
2 This is calculated through MOJ (2012a) statistics on use for central government of for 
that year added to estimated local government requests from the Constitution Unit survey 
of 2010 (with 20% added to estimate increase).  
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represents a problem for the transformative power of the RTI in 
India, which aims to equalise society by empowering all groups. 
The detailed research by Raag/NCPRI found that the users in 
India were overwhelming male (over 90%) and that few requests 
came from the very poor or marginalised groups in either urban or 
rural settings (2009, 8). Requesters are often professionals (61% 
coming from government or private sector) with only 3% from the 
unemployed (Raag/CES 2014). Numerous studies expressed 
concern at low levels regarding awareness of the existence of the 
legislation (Roberts 2010: Raag/NCPRI 2009).  
One crucial requester group and driver of accountability in the UK, 
the media, is absent in India. In the UK the media, both local and 
national, play an important role in FOI use. A small group of 
journalists appear to be heavy users of the Act while a larger 
number publish or run stories based on FOI (Hazell et al 2010: 
Hayes 2009). Journalists play a role as champions of the Act, 
campaigning, protecting it against change, ‘pushing the 
boundaries,’ and innovating with it. Many of the key 
‘accountability’ stories have been pursued by journalists who are 
the user group most frequently mention by politicians (see below).  
Research in India has pointed to a lack of use by the national or 
local press (NCPRI 2009: Relly 2013). While newspapers 
frequently report use by others, and publish op-eds urging use by 
the public, a number of studies have shown that newspapers have 
a lack of interest or believe that the law is not for their use 
(Raag/NCPRI 2009: Relly 2013). This may mean that India lacks a 
powerful defender and vocal user and a strong force for 
accountability.  
A) HIGH PROFILE USE  
Following the idea of Access to Information as a ‘fire alarm’ or tool 
of the ‘watchdog’, the Indian and UK laws have highlighted a series 
of issues, problems and scandals. In the UK these have been driven 
by a diverse mixture of journalists, NGOs and members of the 
public. In India, accountability use appears to be driven primarily 
by NGOs.  
In the UK, a succession of high profile requests began in January, 
2005, with attempts to extract legal advice regarding the war in Iraq 
and Cabinet minutes. Since then, the law has been used to uncover 
information about a range of controversial topics from 
extraordinary rendition, the Libor banking scandal, and reforms of 
the National Health Service (Worthy 2012). In 2013, FOI was used 
to expose failings in London Transport, to uncover a controversial 
Home Office policy urging the public to report illegal immigrants, 
and as a means for following the ongoing creation of a series of 
‘free schools’ across the UK (Burgess 2013). Exposure of wrong 
doing through FOI has led to the resignations of several members 
of devolved assemblies (Worthy and Hazell 2013).  
The high point of FOI in the UK was the revelation of the MPs” 
expenses scandal in 2009. In May 2009, following a four year FOI 
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process by three journalists, the details of MPs’ use of their ACA 
expenses system was leaked to a national newspaper. The resulting 
article led to a number of resignations from the Cabinet, with a 
record number of MPs stepping down, and five MPs imprisoned 
(Kelso 2009: Hazell et al 2012). The crisis led to the creation of a 
new independent body to oversee MPs’ expenses (see below).  
However, the exact consequences of FOI on voters and public 
perceptions may be more nuanced. Despite claims of an “expenses 
election”, the scandal appeared to have little impact on voting 
patterns in the subsequent 2010 General Election (Pattie and 
Johnston 2012). One interesting result was a subsequent “ripple” 
of accountability, as FOI was used to look into the expenses of 
local government councillors, the police and even academics. The 
scandal appeared to increase the overall numbers of FOI requests, 
and has led to interesting “crowd sourcing” experiments when the 
Guardian newspaper opened up records of MPs’ expenses to public 
scrutiny (Worthy 2013b).  
In India, RTI has been used to uncover high profile scandals and 
has proved to be a powerful weapon for producing accountability. 
For example, it was used to obtain information regarding contracts 
and employment for the Commonwealth games of 2010 
(Singh 2013), the sale of 2G mobile phone networks which led to 
questioning of Prime Minister Singh (Reuters 2011), and ahousing 
scandal that led to the resignation of the Chief Minister of 
Maharashtra in 2008 and corruption in aid and food provision 
(Agarwal 2011). According to Calland and Bentley (2013) RTI is 
now “being used as a potent instrument to improve governance 
and transparency across a variety of areas, including the PDS, 
municipalities, elections, trade unions, genetically modified foods, 
dams, and the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act” (s76). 
B) LOW-LEVEL USE 
Underneath the high profile, “tip” of the “iceberg” cases, 
differences emerge. The focus of Access to Information is 
frequently regional or local. Former Scottish Information 
Commissioner described this type of access as “fine-grained 
accountability” working on a daily level that may go unnoticed 
(Dunion 2011, 458).  
At the local government level in the UK, FOI has been used to 
expose a series of controversies related to parking, costs of training 
days and local planning (Worthy 2013, 403). Yet the majority of 
requests to local government entities are “niche” requests 
thatconcern private interests. An examination of these requests 
shows that many have a local focus because they are concerned 
with addressing specific, often personal or “micro-political” issues 
(Worthy 2013, 408).  
By contrast in India, the local and regional focus remains political 
as “most requests are directed to offices of state and local 
government, and focused on seeking redress regarding grievances 
related the failure to deliver public services or complete public 
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works” (Roberts 2010, 6). Calland and Bentley (2013) characterise 
a spreading “politicised use”:  
Since the Act was designed to respond to people’s needs, it has 
been branching out continually…some people use the Act to assert 
their right to food by making ration-related ATI requests…Others 
to address environmental concerns such as closing down a 
polluting factory. There are also some encouraging RTIA success 
stories of individuals or groups that often struggle to implement 
their rights, such as women and people with disabilities (s73). 
These uses are connected to basic rights, curbing 
maladministration and, in some cases, life or death issues of access 
to resources (Raag/NCPRI 2009).  
Taken together, access laws can play a key part in securing 
accountability through transparency, whether at high or low level. 
However, such a result comes with qualifications. First, 
transparency laws do not work in isolation, but work with by 
“traditional” or groups such as NGOs, journalists or 
Parliamentarians. To work, information needs to be turned into 
“accountability”. The MPs’ expense scandal of 2009 was the result 
of requests by three experienced journalists, pursuing the case 
through the appeal system and courts and the crucial moment came 
via a paid for leak to a newspaper rather than disclosure (Worthy 
2013b).  
Second, “FOI actually works in conjunction with wider campaigns 
as a ‘jigsaw’ tool to put together information rather than to obtain 
scandalous “smoking guns” (Worthy and Hazell 2013, 38). It is 
most often part of a wider information-gathering exercise, 
especially at the local level, with information being used to 
incrementally help build and amass evidence (Worthy 2013). A 
final question focuses on how FOI affects public bodies 
themselves.  
§ 4 – THE IMPACT OF TRANSPARENCY LAWS 
Measuring the impact of FOI acess is fraught with difficulties. 
Laws co-exist alongside other reform programmes that havesimilar 
objectives (Worthy 2010), and the methodology for tracing cause 
and effect and determining the results and outcomes is complex 
and nuanced (Hazell and Worthy 2010: Prat 2006). Generally, both 
Acts have been regarded as a success in bringing transparency and 
accountability and, to an extent, shifting cultures. Yet the exact 
effect of these laws on behaviour and processes, whether positive 
or negative, is uncertain.  
A) UK 
In the UK, the Justice Committee concluded that after 10 years 
“the Act has contributed to a culture of greater openness across 
public authorities…many public officials not only…implement the 
Act but work with the spirit of FOI to achieve greater openness” 
(Justice 2012, 11). The government agreed in its response that the 
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“Act has contributed to a culture of greater openness across public 
authorities” (Ministry of Justice 2012, 4). 
Other studies have concluded that FOI has “not met the greatest 
hopes or the worst fears” (Hazell et al 2010, 255). Centrally and 
locally, the Act has made government more open as “FOI does 
bring increased transparency by information release, and 
accountability, in the correct circumstances by questioning and 
receiving an answer based upon that information” (Worthy 2010, 
577). The same conclusion was offered for local government 
(Worthy 2013). In the UK there is variation between different 
government departments or local councils in terms of 
performance, attitude and “openness”. 
There is evidence in the UK that FOI may have some effect on 
systems and procedures, driving behavioural change and even 
facilitating good practices through “smart” regulation. Officials at 
both central and local government levels have spoken about how 
FOI has professionalised decision-making and record keeping and 
created more open cultures (Hazell et al 2010: Worthy 2013). A few 
officials spoke about how FOI had improved relationships with 
the press and stakeholders (Hazell et al 2010). However, FOI’s 
exact effect can only be evaluated in light of whether there has been 
a shift from prior previous practices, and many officials believe that 
they were already operating under scrutiny from many sources 
(Worthy 2013). 
A more difficult question is whether Access to Information laws 
have hada negative effect on bureaucratic behaviour. The potential 
for exposure may lead to subterfuge or “avoidance” rather than 
improvements (Hood 2007). One frequently claimed counter-
productive consequence is that such laws have produced a “chilling 
effect” whereby records are either not kept or are in some way 
distorted to prevent future publication. In the UK, the Justice 
Committee “was not able to conclude, with any certainty, that a 
chilling effect has resulted from the FOI Act ‘(2012, 75). Other 
research has found a marginal negative effect, but with some 
factors (e.g., officials more concerned about the consequences of 
not having a record and the effects of FOI) forced to balance these 
concerns against other interests such as fewer resources for record-
keeping or fear of leaks (Worthy 2013).  
B) INDIA 
In India similarly, a PWC analysis of 2008 concluded that:  
The basic tenets of the Act have been implemented and the 
institutional mechanism is in place and is in use by 
citizens…The institution of Information Commission has 
assumed a pivotal position [and] Civil society organisations 
have been, and continue to be, active in ensuring the 
implementation of the Act in letter and spirit (PWC 2009, 3). 
The Raag/NCPRI study (2009) concluded less optimistically that 
the Act has had “mixed results” (29). The problem appeared to be 
a mixture of systemic and attitudinal inertia:  
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While the awareness of the importance of transparency has 
indeed increased manifold, infrastructure needs to be built 
around it to allow it to work better. At the same time, the 
key to increasing accountability of public authorities lies in 
bringing about attitudinal changes – which is something 
that takes time (29).  
The barriers to behavioural change appear far greater in India. 
Compliance with the law is low and poor administration acts as a 
substantial obstacle. Low administrative capacity, combined with 
low awareness among officials and a lack of resources in both 
bureaucracy and the appeal system, seriously undermines both the 
operation and any consequent benefits of the law (Roberts 2010, 
12-13). The Raag/NCPRI study highlighted a powerful mixture of 
“poor record management, inadequate budgets, [a] wrong mind set 
of civil servants, lack of human resources and lack of training and 
knowledge about the provisions of the Act” (2009, 27). This was 
also a concern in India about a possible chilling effect of the law, 
but there was “little evidence” for any alterations to files or records 
(NCPRI 2009, 28). Implementation of the RTI Act is inconsistent 
“varying from state to state…the process of tracking this 
implementation has yielded important gaps in practice and 
delivery” (Calland and Bentley 2013, s77). 
§ 5 – WIDER BENEFITS OF TRANSPARENCY 
The promise of transparency extends further than simply changing 
processes and promoting behavioural change. Access to 
information is frequently upheld as a reform that can also influence 
corruption, political engagement and trust. Yet each is nuanced and 
complex with evidence pointing in different directions.  
A) CORRUPTION 
A number of studies in India have focused on the effect on 
corruption “[t]he use of RTI to conduct social audits has acted as 
a deterrent to corrupt officials” (Singh 2007, 29). A 2011 study 
concluded that: 
Legislation such as the RTI Act in India…prevents corrupt 
public officials from misusing this information to advance 
their own interest. On the other hand it provides the 
government with more power and public support for 
conducting top down audit of corrupt departments 
(Bhattacharyya and Jha 2011, 14). 
An experiment involving RTI requests requests regarding the 
processing of voting registration found that the making of requests 
“results in dramatically faster processing times” that is “almost as 
effective as bribery” (Peisakhin 2012, 12). It may also have an effect 
on bureaucracy as “officials fear that failures to disclose…will 
negatively affect their chances of promotion” (11).  
Yet others are not convinced that RTI is sufficiently strong to cause 
such an effect. RTI clearly contains a strong “discipline potential” 
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(Webb 2012, 217). Yet the implementation problems and low rates 
of fines are indicative of a lack of enforcement for wrong-doing. 
Sharma (2013) questions the concrete achievements stemming 
from the powerful anti-corruption narrative:  
As far as RTI-informed large-scale exposés are concerned, 
these have been few and far between, and as several senior 
civil servants pointed out, the RTI Act can at best uncover 
a paper trail, and grand corruption typically does not take 
place on files (15). 
The most observable, positive effects of laws on corruption in 
India and the UK have been on institutions and regulations. In 
India in 2013 a new Lokpal or Ombudsman was created to oversee 
government, triggered in part by the ongoing corruption campaign 
in India driven by RTI (Burke 2013). In the future it can be seen 
how RTI exposure could work alongside such a body to pursue. 
Here the UK may provide a guide. The MPs’ crisis led to the 
creation of the Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority 
(IPSA), created to oversee MPs pay. IPSA has become a source of 
resistance and struggle between Parliament and the watchdog, with 
conflict over payments as well as possible pay rises, with the Prime 
Minister hinting that the body may be abolished. Advocates would 
view this as a sign of a regulator doing its job well (Worthy 2013b). 
Other controversies regarding appointments to Britain’s Second 
Chamber revealed by FOI have led to changes in the tax status of 
members (Worthy 2012).  
B) PARTICIPATION 
Despite the hopes of advocates that information will stimulate 
political activity, FOI does not appear to have increased 
participation in the UK (Worthy 2010, 577). It has undoubtedly 
empowered NGOs and other groups at the local and central levels, 
but has not yet led to a widening involvement or arrested the 
historic decline in participation in the UK (Worthy 2013: 
Fox 2012). Even the MPs” expenses scandal failed to ignite 
involvement, despite isolated attempts to “de-select” MPs (Worthy 
2013b).  
By contrast, in India experiments have revealed that information 
obtained through RTI can have an effect on voting patterns 
(Banerjee et al 2010). RTI has also stimulated a political campaign 
that has, in the past year, began to gain a toehold within the political 
system itself. A clear political movement is now beginning to 
emerge from the decade long RTI campaign. In 2013 a 21-year-old 
RTI activist was elected head of a village on an anti-corruption 
ticket, the second such activist to be elected (Parmar 2013). In the 
2013 elections to the state Delhi Congress in December 2013, the 
new Aam Admi Party, created and led by long term RTI 
campaigners, won 28 seats out of a total 70 (India Today 2013).  
C) TRUST 
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Trust is a complex issue and in the UK the Justice Committee 
concluded that FOI had “no generalisable impact” on the level of 
public trust in government (2012, 17-18). In the UK critics claim 
FOI leads to the media highlighting scandals, further undermining 
trust in government. Advocates hope exposure and additional 
information will deter distrustful behavior and lead to more 
informed voters. Superficially, FOI does not appear to have 
increased trust in central government but nor has it led to a 
noticeable drop (Hazell et al 2010). At the local government level, 
traditionally more trusted than central government, voters views 
are more heavily influenced by performance and “community 
visibility” than openness (Worthy 2013). Even the seemingly clear 
case of trust decline created by the MPs’ expenses scandal involves 
nuance, as the disclosure of Parliamentary corruption came as a 
confirmation rather than a revelation to many (Hansard 
Society 2010) and since 2009 levels of trust in MPs have now 
moved back upwards (Fox 2012). The idea that information equals 
increased trust over-simplifies the complex ways in which the 
public approaches politics and presumes a cognitive “blank slate” 
where there are in fact numerous biases, dissonance and 
expectations through which information is processed (De Fine 
Licht 2013: Grimmelikhaujsen 2012).  
§ 6 – THE FUTURE? EXTENSION AND RESISTANCE 
The dynamics of transparency laws represent a continuous 
“fighting on the borders” as various groups seek to extend or 
reduce the reach of access laws. Political conflict is frequently 
focused on extensions versus resistance. 
A) EXTENSION OF TRANSPARENCY 
Access to Information laws cover specific bodies but contain 
clauses that permit extension to new bodies. One vital question is 
the coverage of private contractors. Only the South African PAIA 
specifically enables access to private bodies (Darch and 
Underwood 2005).  
The UK FOI can be extending via secondary legislation under 
section 5 of the Act. FOI does allow access to some information 
held by private bodies relating to public work and most bodies are 
happy to provide it, albeit with some high profile exceptions 
(Worthy 2013). In the UK the Brown government committed in 
2007 to extend the Act to all public work carried out by private 
bodies but eventually did not do, concerned about potential costs 
to businesses. In 2010 the new Coalition government also 
committed to the same end but are yet to do so. The recent post-
legislative scrutiny recommended that FOI be enforced by 
contracts rather than by explicit extension of the Act (Justice 2012).  
In India legal rulings have made formerly public bodies subject to 
the RTI Act. There was also debate about extending the Act to 
cover the stock-exchange and controversy over access to 
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information concerning Public Private contracts (Roberts 2010). 
Between 2012 and 2013, there was battle to open up both the 
Indian Cricket board and political parties to RTI. As of December 
a 2013 a bill before Parliament proposed to specifically exempt 
political parties from the law’s application, but that bill has stalled 
with the new government.  
B) RESISTANCE  
As forces outside of government seek to extend access, forces 
within the government can seek to resist the law and even restrict 
its remit or weaken it through legislative change. The UK 
government warned that “the formative years of open government 
will be difficult, tricky and uncomfortable at times” (Cabinet 
Office 2012, 6). Resistance in the UK includes use of the veto 
outlined above. On a day-to-day level there may be elements of 
“game playing” around controversial requests with attempts to 
delay or muddy the waters (Hazell et al 2010).  
Politicians have a narrow view of FOI as they only see few requests, 
often the most sensitive or media driven. In 2010 Tony Blair 
became the most prominent critic of FOI, claiming it was abused 
and misused: 
The truth is that the FOI Act isn’t used, for the most part, 
by “the people”. It’s used by journalists. For political leaders, 
it’s like saying to someone who is hitting you over the head 
with a stick, “Hey, try this instead”, and handing them a 
mallet (Blair 2010, 516-517). 
The danger is that such negativity may encourage poor behaviour 
and lead to a small “anti-FOI” group at the very top of government 
(BBC 14 Mar 2012). 
Political disquiet has extended to more than simply negative 
signals, translating into several attempts to reform the Act. In 2006 
the Blair government sought to change the costs imposed for 
requests and floated the introducingf a standard application fee, 
reforms which would have curtailed use of the law. In 2007 a group 
of MPs sought to exclude Parliament from the ambit of the Act 
but failed to reach the Second Chamber. In 2009 the Monarch and 
the heir to the throne were made exempt from the Act. As of 2013 
the Coalition government expressed concern over “industrial” use 
of FOI (Worthy and Hazell 2013).  
In India the “game-playing” and resistance is more severe, possibly 
compounded by poor resources and implementation as well as pre-
existing power-relations. Numerous studies highlighting delay and 
“blocking” as well as overt hostility to requests 
(Raag/NCPRI 2009: Roberts 2010). The lukewarm attitudes of 
senior politicians are also in evidence. In 2012 Prime Minister 
Singh spoke in terms very close to those of Tony Blair: 
There are concerns about frivolous and vexatious use of the 
Act in demanding information disclosure of which cannot 
possibly serve any public purpose…This important 
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legislation should not only be about criticising, ridiculing and 
running down public authorities (Times of India 2012). 
In India there exists a far more potent threat, that of violence. A 
CHRI study of 2013 recorded “31 alleged murders and 2 alleged 
suicides and more than 214 assaults…directly linked to the fact that 
the victims sought some information under the RTI Act which 
proved detrimental to their life and safety” (CHRI 2013). The 
potential of RTI as an exposer of corruption also brings powerful 
risks. 
§ 7 – ACCESS TO INFORMATION: EMPOWERMENT AND CONTEXT 
To understand transparency, it is necessary to reflect on how the 
particular context of a political system shapes what can and cannot 
be achieved. In the UK, FOI was introduced into a political system 
that was becoming increasingly transparent with numerous pre-
existing mechanisms of accountability. In this sense FOI “went 
with the grain” of other change, so reforms mutually reinforced 
each other. Yet FOI ran against historically low levels of 
participation and trust, further eroded by conflictual government 
and media relations (Worthy 2010: Fox 2012).  
In India expectations are even higher. A 2012 study concludes that 
RTI “has the power to erase social, cultural and economic 
differences” and reduce the “vast inequalities” between 
government and “the least privileged members of society” (12). 
While 16% of RTI requests are overtly aimed at expressing 
grievances many more are “disguised” versions of the same thing 
(Raag/CES 2014, 2). Yet numerous socio-cultural and political 
factors limit what RTI can achieve to even greater degree. To take 
one simple example, first, “using average wage rates and 
transportation costs, it finds that the true economic cost of filing 
an RTI request is about 250 rupees in rural India, and twice that in 
urban areas amounts substantially larger than the ten-rupee 
application fee” (PWC 2009, 134). 
A more nuanced obstacle is the complex social relationships within 
Indian society. Use of RTI is primarily, if not overwhelmingly, by the 
educated, urban and male (Raag/NCPRI 2009). Very few members 
of the lower Indian social groups, particularly those below the poverty 
line, use RTI and, indeed, few appear to be aware of its existence 
(Raag/NCPRI 2009). Given the powerful obstacles, the idea of large 
sections of the poor using RTI is “illusory” (Webb 2012, 218). Cain et 
al found with FOI regimes elsewhere that received wisdom about 
bureaucratic unresponsiveness led to an automatic discounting of the 
possibilities of asking (Cain et al 2003). As of 2014, rural requesters 
make up only 14% of all requesters, despite representing 70% of 
India’s population (Raag/CES 2014, 61). 
Instead RTI use is driven by proxies, primarily NGOs led by 
middle-class activists. Webb (2012) points out that this use by the 
educated middle-class in “brokerage and mediation” is exactly the 
situation RTI was intended to avoid (210). Moreover, many of the 
“opaque and informal conduits” that the RTI Act seeks to end and 
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close are “essential to allow the urban poor to survive” (207). Here 
the RTI Act resembles other legislation such as the Public Access 
to Information Act in South Africa, where legislation is caught 
within a network of complex social, political and cultural relation 
and barriers that hinder the operation of the Act (Darch and 
Underwood 2005).  
CONCLUSION 
This paper has demonstrated how access to information laws in 
both the UK and India can help bring about transparency and 
accountability, working as a crowd-sourced “fire alarm” to 
highlight problems nationally and locally while also driving changes 
in process and behaviour. Transparency laws can bring more 
concrete discernable shifts, creating new bodies or legal change. 
India’s more “politicised” use has also stimulated political activism.  
Yet the potential of transparency laws exists within clear limits. The 
legislation is fragile in a number of senses. First, to work 
“properly,” laws require use and the correct context. Most 
importantly they require support from other political mechanisms. 
When the legislation “works” either as fire alarm or instrument of 
behaviour change it is because it has combined with other 
mechanisms.  
Second, laws require capacity and resources on the part of 
government. They can and are defeated and undermined by poor 
capacity and lack of awareness or training. While the UK offers a 
reasonably robust base the poor capacity of Indian government 
remains a powerful obstacle. The exact borders and limits of both 
laws are dynamic. There will be a continual fighting on margins 
over coverage, change or resources. Yet there will also be 
innovation and change.  
Third, related to this is the question of “political will” (Calland and 
Bentley 2013). Transparency laws require support from those most 
likely to be damaged by them. In India and the UK hostility to the 
legislation and resistance is present. In numerous forms, from 
expressions of unhappiness to attempts to curb or limit the scope 
of laws, both systems are constantly under threat. This plays into a 
further point that transparency is also shaped by the perceptions of 
politicians. While this may bear little resemblance to reality, their 
views are crucial.  
Finally, the socio-political context in which laws exist. Not all the 
barriers to successful outcomes lie with government. While access 
legislation seeks to re-shape cultures and systems, these self-same 
cultures and systems can shape the laws. In India particularly, the 
transformative potential can be undermined by pre-existing 
relations, attitudes and ideas. It remains to be seen if information 
reform in the long term can incrementally break down these more 
hidden barriers.  
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